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Abstract—In this article, we investigate the impact of re-
dundant MEMS-IMU on a loosely coupled INS/GBAS system.
Therefore, we consider and analyze the combined performance
of three identically and orthogonally mounted low-cost IMUs.
It is shown that due to the redundancy, the INS based position
error is reduced by an average factor of two. In conventional
GBAS, no position solution can be obtained while GPS is no
available which lead to a full system failure. It is demonstrated
that our redundant INS/GBAS integration sufficiently bridges
GPS outages up to 10 seconds. Hence, the system availability
is significantly improved. Additionally, an integrity concept is
introduced providing integrity information even in the case where
no GPS solution is available. This is essential for all safety-of-life
applications such as civil aviation. We analyze our concept both,
analytically and by Monte-Carlo Simulations. Our investigations
clearly show that the robustness of the GBAS can be dramatically
increased while maintaining low-costs and low-complexity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Low cost Inertial Measurement Units (IMUs) based on
Micro-Electro-Mechanical System (MEMS) technology have
been in the focus of past and current research. In comparison
to high-end IMUs, an entire Inertial Navigation System (INS)
can be implemented with smaller size/volume, lower weight
and costs. In exchange, they have a rather low accuracy
performance due to their large systematic errors such as biases,
scale factors and drifts, which are strongly dependent on tem-
perature [1]. Hence, MEMS IMUs are not used for traditional,
stand-alone, inertial applications but for integrated systems
in which they are coupled with other sensors to compensate
the temporally increasing errors. Regarding robust navigation,
the short-time stable INS is often combined with the long-
time stable Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). Three
different INS/GNSS integration strategies are well known: the
loosely, tightly and deeply coupled systems. They differ in
their system integration level, their inter-system dependencies,
achievable integrity and design complexity. Among these
strategies, the loosely coupled system provides the lowest
dependency level and simplest system design [2]. Thus, it is
widely used in today’s integrated applications. For this scheme,
the position and velocity estimates of a GNSS receiver are
used as additional observations in the INS position filter to
enhance the INS accuracy. However, the GNSS PVT (Position-
Velocity-Time) solution is not affected by the INS. Consider-
ing the case where no GNSS PVT solution is available, i.e.
less than four satellites are visible, the INS can exclusively
determine the position for a certain period of time. The
length of this period depends on the quality of the IMU,
i.e., its stability and error performance. Out of the different
IMU technologies, MEMS based IMUs have the worst error
performance, i.e., high instabilities, drifts and measurement
noise. Consequently, they are normally only able to sufficiently
coast the position for a couple of seconds.
To improve the inertial error performance, a network of
MEMS IMU sensors could be used. By exploring the emerging
measurement redundancy with suitable combination strategies
and appropriate sensor distributions, the coast time can be
significantly increased. Due to the size and price decreasing
trend of the sensors, the investigation of sensor networks is
a very promising approach with respect to economical and
ergonomic consequences. For instant, skew-redundant IMUs
(SRIMUs) consist of a redundant number of inertial sensors
skewed against each other. Their configuration encapsulates a
maximum amount of information depending on the number of
sensors and the configuration geometry. Studies have shown
that the gained redundancy can improve the INS performance
significantly [1], [3], [4], [5]. Via simulations and theoretical
derivations, Sukkarieh et. al in [4] have shown that the
accuracy can be improved by 33 % by placing the MEMS-
IMUs on a thetrahedron. Other studies [3] compared the
performance difference of orthogonally-redundant and skew-
redundant IMUs.
In combination with GNSS, it can improve the system
performance on several levels. The noise estimation can be
obtained directly from the data and more realistic, stochastic
error modeling is possible. Consequently, the noise level can
be reduced and faulty signals and sensor malfunctioning can
be detected and isolated. Furthermore, sensor error calibration
is achievable even during uniform motion or static initial-
ization [3]. Based on commonly acknowledged models [3],
[6], we simulate a network of identically and orthogonally
mounted IMUs and determine their system performance via
Monte-Carlo simulations. We show that the accuracy and
stability performance can be significantly improved.
In this paper, we investigate the effect of the inertial
redundancy in a Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS)
for aviation. In GBAS, local reference receivers located around
the airport are used to formulate a correction message, which
is transmitted to users. A receiver on an aircraft uses this
information to correct GPS signals [7]. In this paper, the
corrected GPS position is combined with the inertial network
and the performance.
Moreover, we apply an integrity concept based on the
known GNSS RAIM (Receiver Autonomous Integrity Mon-
itoring) algorithm [8] to inertial sensors. We investigate this
integrity algorithm in both, analytically as well as via simu-
lations. Our new system presented in this paper is a low-cost
and low-complex approach providing sufficient GNSS outage
bridging performance while achieving the required integrity
standards.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
A. Inertial Sensor Error Model
Complex and detailed based on different technologies have
been presented in [2] and [1]. According to [6], however it is
sufficient to use a simplified error model for low-cost sensors.
Given that the misalignment of the different measuring axes
are known, it can be written as:
sˆ(t) = (1 + sf )s(t) + b(t), (1)
where sˆ(t) is the measured sensor output, i.e an angular
turn rate and longitudinal acceleration, respectively. The true
value of this quantity is denoted as s(t). This true value is
corrupted by a certain scale factor sf and a bias b(t). The
latter can be modeled by a constant offset b0 as well as a
time varying component b1(t) and sampling noise bw. In this
paper, we will assume that the scaling factor and the offset are
corrected by an initial calibration of the sensors. Additionally,
the sampling noise is assumed to be Gaussian distributed
with zero-mean and a given variance σ2w. Based on several
measurement analysis in [6], the time-varying component can
be represented by a 1st-order Gauss-Markov process such as
b˙1(t) = −1
τ
b1(t) + nb1 , (2)
where τ is the time constant or also called correlation time
and nb1 is the driving process noise which can be assumed
to be Gaussian distributed with zero mean and variance σ2b1 .
This error model is applied to the acceleration as well as to
the turn rate values in order to simulated a realistic behavior
of IMU.
These erroneous inertial measurements are then processed
by a traditional strapdown algorithm. Hence, the following
navigation equations need to be solved [1]:
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given the observations ωbib and f
n. It is assumed that the
gravitation gn, and the initial conditions are known.
B. Redundant Inertial Navigation
Inertial sensor networks have been investigated in liter-
ature [3], [4], [5], [9]. Waegli in [3] has compared the
performance difference of orthogonally-redundant and skew-
redundant IMUs. Based on these results, we investigate a low
complex approach in order to obtain a first idea of the GBAS
performance impact. We use three orthogonally mounted low-
cost IMUs. We assume that the misalignment between the
IMUs is perfectly known and hence, they are not discussed
further. The redundancy is exploited at the sensor level. This
means each IMU is processed individually and their combined
sensor information is used to obtain the navigation solution.
Consequently, the combined measurement noise is reduced by
a factor of
√
3 assuming the measurement noise of the different
IMUs is independent and shows a constant variance during
the measurements [1]. Furthermore, this combined inertial
solution based on Equation (3) is used for the loosely-coupled
GBAS integration.
C. INS/GBAS Integrated Navigation
For our investigations, we consider a loosely coupled
INS/GPS integration algorithm. This scheme offers a high
interchangeability of the involved GNSS and IMU sensors.
Based on the nature of the inertial navigation, the pure inertial
navigation error increases over time since it accumulates all
occurring measuring errors. Consequently, the INS needs a
frequent update of its error behavior in order to compensate
these errors.
In this investigations, the GBAS based GPS navigation
solution is used to obtain these errors. That is a full satellite
based solution is required to correct inertial position errors. In
case no GPS based solution is available, the INS starts to drift
and the position error increases. The degradation of the INS
over time depends on the quality of the IMU itself. Given a
certain maximum error performance, the time of GPS outages
coasted by the INS is limited. In this paper, we use a redundant
network of inertial sensors to increase the performance of
low-cost MEMS sensor while maintaining low cost and low
complexity.
D. Ground Based Augmented System
Ground Based Augmentation Systems (GBAS) have been
developed to allow robust local navigation for precision ap-
proach of aircraft with 2 Hz position update. The GBAS
architecture has been investigated the last 25 years [10]. In
2009, a first GBAS station was approved for CAT I precision
approach procedures. The current work is concentrated in the
development of GBAS for CAT III precision approaches. Two
different architectures are proposed:
• A short term one, keeping the actual constellation (GPS
single frequency configuration) and proposing additional
monitors on ground and on board to achieve the stringent
integrity and continuity requirements
• A long term one considering a multi-constellation (GPS
and Galileo), multi frequency (L1/E1, L5/E5a, E5b) based
GBAS solution
The user corrects its pseudo-range measurements using
the pseudo range corrections and the range rate corrections
received from the ground subsystem through the VHF Data
Broadcast (VDB) link. Simultaneously, the user calculates the
integrity information of the position in terms of protection
levels for the fault free case (H0) and for the reference receiver
fault case (H1). The resulting protection level is the maximum
of the two. For Differentially Corrected Positioning Service
(DCPS) an additional protection level the so called ephemeris
protection level is considered. It accounts for large ephemeris
error observed by the ground subsystem for a given satellite.
The overall protection level is then the maximum of the three.
III. INTEGRITY CONCEPT
A. Protection level concept of an inertial based navigation
solution
The short term stability of MEMS based INS is compen-
sated by an accurate GBAS solution. Protection levels as
defined in the Minimum Operational Performance Standards
(GBAS MOPS) should be extended to take into account the
contribution of the inertial navigation system. The Vertical
Protection Level (VPL) expression of the combined solution
depends on the vertical protection level of each system as well
as the used integration scheme. For simplification, only the
VPL is considered in this chapter. Similarly considerations
can be done for the Lateral Protection Level (LPL) or the
Horizontal Protection Level (HPL).
We recall the fault free vertical protection level for a GBAS
system (for more details see for example [7]):
VPLGBAS,H0(t) = KffmdσGBAS,V, (4)
with Kffmd representing a multiplier which determines the
probability of fault-free missed detection and σGBAS,V is the
standard deviation of the over-bounded vertical error of a
GBAS solution. This protection level can be estimated at each
time step depending on the ground subsystem information
and the actual geometry of satellites chosen to calculate the
position.
The inertial navigation system is based on longitudinal
and rotational acceleration sensors. The preceding chapter
proposed a sensor error model which is a random model taking
into account sensor imperfection. Thus the navigation solution
error is a random process solution of a stochastic differential
equation (see Equation (3)). Assuming the random process is
a diffusion process, it can be characterized by a drift and a
diffusion coefficient.
We define a protection level for the navigation solution using
a stand-alone INS only for a short time period from 0 to T :
VPLINS (T ) = max
0≤t≤T
(|bINS,V (t)|) +Kffmd max
0≤t≤T
(σINS,V ) ,
(5)
where max0≤t≤T (|bINS,V (t)|) is the maximal absolute bias
of the INS in the the vertical direction during the time period
[0, T ] and σINS,V is the standard deviation of the overbounded
vertical component of the INS error. This standard deviation
is a function of time. The same applies for the bias, therefore
it is necessary to take the maximum value during the time
period [0, T ].
1) Theoretical vertical protection level using a simplified
scenario: Let consider only a vertical acceleration of the
aircraft without any attitude change. Under these conditions,
the vertical position of the aircraft can be determined using
only the vertical accelerometer or the combination of redun-
dant vertical accelerometers. We simplify the Equation (1) to
obtain:
sˆ(t) = s(t) + b1(t), (6)
given that the scaling factors sf , null-shifts b0 and the sam-
pling noise bw are zero. the time-varying bias b1(t) is solution
of the stochastic differential Equation (2).
If we rewrite the equation 2 in a differential way and
introducing the one-dimensional Brownian motion Bt we
obtain:
db1 = −1
τ
b1dt+ σb1dBt. (7)
It can be seen that under the considered assumptions b1 is
an Itoˆ diffusion process characterized by a drift − 1
τ
b1 and a
diffusion coefficient of σ2b1/2.
We are interested in the evolution of the vertical position
with respect to time therefore the only variables considered
are the time and the vertical component of the position xv .
The generator of this diffusion process can be expressed by:
Af (x) = −1
τ
b1
∂f
∂xv
+
1
2
σ2b1
∂2f
∂x2v
(8)
for any f ∈ C2
0
(R).
The Kolmogorov Forward Equation gives the law of evolution
of the density of distribution of the parameter b1
∂pb1
∂t
=
1
τ
∂b1pb1
∂xv
+
1
2
σ2b1
∂2pb1
∂x2v
(9)
pb1 (0, xv) = f (xv) (10)
where f is the initial density of b1.
Fig. 1. Evolution of the density of b1 vs. t for τ = 100 seconds and
σb1 = 1.2 milli g
Figure 1 shows the solution of the Kolmogorov forward
equation. The integration time is 5 seconds. The used param-
eters are τ = 100 seconds and σb1 = 1.2 milli-g as proposed
in [6]. We assumed an initial Gaussian distribution of b1 to be
centered with a standard deviation of 10−3m/s2.
To show the impact of imperfections in the accelerometer,
let us assume the true acceleration to be zero. The uncertainty
in the acceleration due to imperfections in the accelerometer
are defined as:
sˆ(t) = b1(t), (11)
sˆ(t) is a random process following the same law as b1(t).
The impact of these imperfections in velocity and in position
domain can be obtained by simple integration with respect
to time. Assuming the vertical speed at t = 0, vv(0) = v0v
and the initial height h(0) = h0, Figure 2 shows the resulting
altitude error density. In the simulations, we considered the
initial vertical speed to be zero (v0v = 0).
Fig. 2. Evolution of the density of altitude error vs. t for τ = 100 seconds
and σb1 = 1.2 milli g
For each time t, it is possible to find the Gaussian over
bound of the vertical error, take the maximum standard
deviation of all these Gaussian over bounds in the considered
period of time and multiply it with Kffmd to find the impact
of the accelerometer imperfections in the protection levels.
As the altitude error is a diffusion process, the maximum
values are obtained at t = T (at the end of the time period).
We can see that the protection level is very sensitive to the
integration time. We considered the initial distribution of b1 to
be centered which is not the reality. A non centrality term will
automatically introduce a bias in the altitude error and should
be taken into consideration in the protection level equation (5).
2) Impact of the use of 2 redundant accelerometers:
Considering the usage of 2 redundant accelerometers with
independent imperfections, the measurement given by the ac-
celerometer 1 and 2 is defined as sˆ1(t) and sˆ2(t), respectively.
The average of these observations at each time t as the best
estimate of the acceleration in the vertical direction [1].
sˆ(t) =
1
2
(sˆ1(t) + sˆ2(t)) . (12)
The stochastic differential equation verified by b1i for the
accelerometer i is:
db1i = −1
τ
b1idt+ σb1idBit (13)
Considering the simplified Equation (11),
sˆ(t) =
1
2
(b11(t) + b12(t)) . (14)
Assuming two independent Brownian motions with the
same diffusion coefficients:
dsˆ = −1
τ
sˆdt+
1
2
(σb1 σb1)
(
dB1
dB2
)
, (15)
the drift coefficient is the average of accelerometer drifts and
the diffusion coefficient is σ2b1/4, which is half of the diffusion
coefficient of an accelerometer alone.
In the case where both accelerometers have the same drift,
the combination will remain after averaging (no benefit of
redundancy). If the drifts are equal in magnitude but opposite
in sign, the averaging will eliminate the drift (full benefit of
redundancy). These properties directly impact the protection
levels for the inertial system by keeping or reducing the bias
term of equation 5 and reducing by a half the component due
to the diffusion part.
B. Integrity concept of INS/GBAS integrated solution
The GBAS system is designed for precision approach under
low visibility conditions. The integrity and continuity require-
ments are therefore very stringent. Inertial aiding provides
additional robustness. As mentioned in one of the previous
sections, we consider a low-complex INS/GBAS integration
scheme which calibrates the INS with GBAS when GBAS is
available (in a nominal operation every 0.5 second). That is the
vertical position error density generated by the GBAS system
will be the initial condition for the density of the INS error
during the coasting phase (n/2 < t < (n+ 1) /2).
Figure 2 shows the density of the vertical error with the Dirac
density at t = 0. In order to consider the effect of a vertical
error due to GBAS, one must calculate for each time step
the convolution of the error density due to the imperfection
of the sensor with the error density over bound due to the
GBAS system (which is considered as a constant until the
next update).
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In the following section, we compare our simulation re-
sults of the GBAS integration with the single IMU and
orthogonally-redundant INS in terms of position error perfor-
mance, GBAS outage coasting ability and resulting integrity
capability. The GBAS related data has been recorded during
a flight trail with the DLR’s experimental GBAS facility in
Braunschweig on November, 27th in 2009. The inertial data is
Sensor σw σb1 τ
Gyro 0.05 [◦/hr] 360 [◦/sec] 300 [sec]
Acceler. 1× 10−3 [g] 2.4× 10−3 [g] 100 [sec]
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS OF THE GYROSCOPE AND ACCERLEROMETER
ERROR MODELS GIVEN IN [6], WHERE σ2w IS THE SAMPLING NOISE
VARIANCE, σ2
b1
IS THE DRIVING NOISE VARIANCE OF THE 1ST-ORDER
GAUSS-MARKOV PROCESS AND τ ITS CORRELATION TIME.
simulated accordingly to the previously discussed error model.
The used model parameters can be seen in Table IV.
We consider two different scenarios, first GBAS is available
throughout the flight trail and secondly synthetic GBAS or
rather GPS outages occur with a duration of ∆t seconds.
A. Position Accuracy
Investigating the two different INS schemes, the
orthogonally-redundant IMU clearly outperforms the single
IMU approach. That is the former produces on average a
twice better error performance than the latter one. In Figure 3
the average position improvement of the two stand-alone INS
over time is displayed. It can be seen that the beginning the
improvement is much higher than in the end. This is due to
the long-term error characteristics of the IMUs. Consequently,
the most performance improvement of the redundant IMU in
comparison to the single IMU can be expected for short-time
GPS outages.
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Fig. 3. Position Error performance improvement of the three orthogonally-
redundant IMUs in comparison to the single IMU case.
B. Coasting of GBAS outages
Based on the previous results, it can be expected that
the redundant IMU/GBAS scheme allow much larger GPS
outage durations. In Figure 4 the error performance of the
redundant IMU/GBAS for different GBAS outage durations
∆t is displayed. The longer this duration is the larger is the
error. The error improvement factor to the single IMU case is
shown in Figure 5.
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Fig. 4. Position error performance for different GBAS outage durations
∆t = [1s 5s 10s 15s 20s 25s 30s].
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C. Integrity Analysis
Comparison of the integrity information to the alert levels
defined for civil aviation. The alert levels define a maximum
allowed error performance for CAT I precision approach. It
can be seen, that the protection levels based on the redundant
IMU/GBAS scheme full the requirements for a maximum
outage duration of 10 s, where as the single IMU/GBAS
scheme only allows a maximum duration of 5s. This can be
seen in Figure 6 and Figure 7, respectively.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown that three orthogonally
mounted low-cost MEMS-IMUs can improve the performance
of an INS/GBAS scheme by the factor of two. This preliminary
investigations with a relative simple integration approach illus-
trate the potential of redundant IMUs for integrated systems.
We further introduced and discussed a low-complex integrity
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Fig. 6. Protection level performance of the redundant IMU/GBAS scheme
for different GBAS outage durations ∆t = [1s 5s 10s 15s 20s 25s 30s].
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Fig. 7. Protection level performance of the redundant IMU/GBAS scheme
for different GBAS outage durations ∆t = [1s 5s 10s 15s 20s 25s 30s].
concept to access integrity information even during GBAS
outages. This capability is essential for all safety-of-life appli-
cations, especially in civil aviation.
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